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Hosanna-Tabor1 concerns the separation of church and state, which is
an often-misunderstood arrangement that is nevertheless a critical
dimension of the freedom of religion protected by the First Amendment to
our Constitution. For nearly a thousand years, the tradition of Western
constitutionalism—the project of protecting political freedom by marking
boundaries to the power of government—has been strengthened by the
principled commitment to religious liberty and church–state separation. A
community that respects both the importance of, and the distinction
between, independent spheres of political and religious authority is one in
which the fundamental rights of all are more secure. A government that
acknowledges this distinction acknowledges limits to its own reach. Such a
government, history shows, will more consistently protect and vindicate the
liberties of both individuals and institutions.
The principle of church–state separation—from the time of Becket, to
Blackstone, to Benjamin Franklin, to today—has long meant, among other
things, that religious communities and institutions enjoy meaningful
autonomy and independence with respect to their governance, teachings,
and doctrines. This independence, recognized and vindicated in a long line
and wide array of decisions by the Supreme Court, is entirely consistent
with the appropriate powers of civil authorities.
The ―ministerial exception,‖ at issue in Hosanna-Tabor, is a clear and
crucial implication of religious liberty, church autonomy, and the separation
of church and state—principles embodied in both the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. The exception, to use the
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words of one prominent decision, ―operates to bar any claim‖ by or on
behalf of a minister—including, but not limited to, nondiscrimination
suits—―the resolution of which would limit a religious institution‘s right to
select who will perform particular spiritual functions.‖2 It seems to us that
because any worthwhile account of religious freedom would respect the
authority of religious communities to select freely their own clergy,
ministers, teachers, and doctrines, any such account must include some rule
like the ministerial exception. Reasonably constructed and applied, this
rule helps civil decisionmakers avoid deciding essentially religious
questions. In addition, and more importantly, it protects the fundamental
freedom of religious communities to educate their members and form them
spiritually and morally. Although the exception may, in some cases, block
lawsuits against religious institutions and communities for discrimination, it
rests on the overriding and foundational premise that there are some
questions the civil courts do not have the power to answer, some wrongs
that a constitutional commitment to church–state separation puts beyond the
law‘s corrective reach. The civil authority—that is, the authority of a
constitutional government—lacks ―competence‖ to intervene in such
questions, not so much because they lie beyond its technical or intellectual
capacity, but because they lie beyond its jurisdiction.
For these reasons, over the last forty years every federal circuit has
adopted some version of the ministerial exception. From practical
experience, judges know how employment litigation can entangle a court
with the decisionmaking of a religious organization in the core matter of
who is qualified to lead the organization and speak on its behalf. The wide
range of judges who have approved of the exception are not trying to avoid
applying nondiscrimination laws, but are trying to fulfill their parallel
responsibility to protect religious liberty and church–state separation.
Other essays in this colloquy focus on the details of this federal case
law and on the question to what extent the ministerial exception applies to
teachers in religious schools. Our primary focus in this piece, drawn from
an amicus brief we filed in Hosanna-Tabor, is more foundational and
historical.3 Unfortunately, in its Hosanna-Tabor submissions, the federal
government has chosen to reject decades of precedent and deny the
existence of any distinct ministerial exception grounded in the Religion
Clauses. It therefore is important to restate first principles and show why it
is so important that the government respect religious organizations‘

2

Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2006) (link).
See Brief Amici Curiae of Professor Eugene Volokh et al. in Support of the Petitioner, HosannaTabor, No. 10-553 (2011), 2011 WL 2470847 [hereinafter Amicus Brief] (link). That brief includes
arguments that the ministerial exception should cover teachers with religious duties at religiously
affiliated K–12 schools, including the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor, Cheryl Perich. See id. at 28–38.
Those arguments are largely outside the scope of this paper, although we briefly summarize them infra
in note 57.
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decisions on who are qualified to be their ministers—to perform important
religious functions. In this Essay we review centuries of church–state
history and draw two lessons. First, the ability of religious organizations to
choose ministers without government interference is at the core of our
tradition of institutional religious freedom and church–state separation:
virtually every major advance in this tradition has involved government
interference in such choices. Second, the ministerial exception follows
naturally from this tradition, and—contrary to the arguments of the
exception‘s critics—the tradition bars government interference in the
selection of those performing important religious functions, even when that
interference is for ostensibly ―neutral‖ or ―secular‖ reasons that do not
involve the government making explicit theological determinations.
I. CHURCH–STATE SEPARATION AND THE SELECTION OF MINISTERS
The separation of church and state is controversial in some of its
applications, but there is long tradition and broad consensus in favor of at
least institutional separation. 4 While not completely sealed off from each
other by a ―high and impregnable‖5 wall, the agencies and authority of the
―state‖ are distinct from those of the ―church,‖ and neither can rightfully
exercise the core functions of the other. Indeed, the ―establishment‖ of
religion prohibited by the First Amendment denotes not just sponsorship or
financial support of religion, but also ―active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity.‖6
Over the centuries, Western civilization gradually acknowledged an
―independence between church and state‖ and the ―existence of two
authority structures.‖7 Since the fourth century, ―Western civilization has
presupposed that there are not one but two sovereigns. Each has a
jurisdiction of legitimate operation, and while there are areas of shared
cognizance, there are other areas in which each is noncompetent to perform
the tasks of the other.‖8 Thus, ―[w]hen the civil state overreaches and
performs a task within the sole province of the church, or misguided
officials attempt to delegate an exclusive state function to the church, the
boundary between church and state is transgressed.‖9 This differentiation
4

See generally BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE: 1050–1300 (1964) (link);
Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 59 (2007).
5
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (link).
6
Walz v. Tax Comm‘n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (link).
7
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN H ISTORY: KEY D OCUMENTS, DECISIONS, AND COMMENTARY
FROM THE PAST T HREE CENTURIES 10 (John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman eds., 3d ed. 2003) (link);
see also id. at 1–12.
8
Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church–State Settlement in the Early
American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1392 (link); see also JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., Are
There Two or One? The Question of the Future of Freedom, in WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS : CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 183–199 (2005 ed.).
9
Esbeck, supra note 8, at 1392 (footnote omitted).
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between political and religious institutions has long been a part of the
American constitutional tradition, and Americans—despite their diversity
and differences—have agreed that ―jurisdictional separation of the two
authorities of church and state best facilitates healthy churches and a
republic free of civil strife over religious doctrine.‖10
Although disagreement regarding the precise details of church–state
separation persists, there appears to be solid agreement that, for example,
this arrangement does not permit political authorities to delegate core
government functions to churches. 11 Hosanna-Tabor involves what should
be seen as a complementary principle: government may not insert itself into
controversies over the ecclesiastical functions of religious organizations, in
particular, disputes regarding the selection and supervision of ministers.
Congress, all agree, could not leave it to the United States Conference of
Catholic Bishops to determine the sanctions for violations of federal drugtrafficking laws. It should be no less clear that, just as Congress should not
attempt to resolve disagreements among Christians about infant baptism, a
court should not presume to supervise or second-guess a religious
community‘s selection of one person, rather than another, to be its minister.
In fact, the Court has long recognized that a key component of religious
liberty and church–state separation is the autonomy of religious
organizations over matters of governance as well as doctrine. 12
Both Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise Clause, protect this autonomy. In this context, the
two clauses overlap and reinforce each other. The Court typically
categorizes religion cases under one or the other of the two clauses, but in
limiting government intervention into internal church disputes, the Court
has frequently relied simply on ―the First Amendment‖ or ―the Religion
Clauses.‖13 In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church, for example, the Court held that a statute transferring institutional
authority and property in the Russian Orthodox Church ―violate[d] our rule
of separation between church and state‖ as well as ―the free exercise of

10

Id. at 1497.
See Larkin v. Grendel‘s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982) (striking down delegation to
churches of ―discretionary governmental powers‖ to reject an applicant for a liquor license) (link).
12
See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952) (holding that the First Amendment guarantees ―a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine‖) (link); Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728–29 (1872) (noting the ―unquestioned‖ right in America of
―voluntary religious associations‖ to decide ―controverted questions of faith‖ and matters of
―ecclesiastical government‖) (link).
13
See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499 (1979) (―the First Amendment‖ and
―the Religion Clauses‖) (link); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976)
(―the First and Fourteenth Amendments‖) (link); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Mem‘l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449–51 (1969) (―the First Amendment‖) (link).
11
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religion.‖14 Indeed, the Court‘s Establishment Clause decisions speaking of
church–state separation repeatedly emphasize that it protects religious
communities as well as the body politic. 15
The ―separation of church and state,‖ then, in our tradition ―denote[s] a
structural arrangement involving institutions, a constitutional order in which
the institutions of religion . . . are distinct from, other than, and
meaningfully independent of, the institutions of government.‖16 The
ministerial exception is just one manifestation of this tradition of
institutional separation and institutional religious freedom. At the same
time, it involves a crucial principle that lies close to the heart of this
tradition, namely, that government may not interfere with religious
institutions in controversies concerning their selection and supervision of
leaders and religious teachers, and secular courts should not entertain
employee lawsuits ―the resolution of which would limit a religious
institution‘s right to select who will perform particular spiritual functions.‖17
II. THE TRADITION OF FREEDOM TO SELECT MINISTERS
A. History
The ultimate authority of religious organizations to select and
supervise their leaders has been vital to the development of institutional
religious freedom. Virtually every major advance in that tradition has
stemmed from some conflict over the government‘s intervention in this area
of decisionmaking. Among the best known of such conflicts in European
civilization was the investiture controversy of the eleventh and twelfth
centuries, in which popes and monarchs fought over who would have the
authority to appoint Catholic bishops. 18 Pope Gregory VII excommunicated
German emperor Henry IV over the issue until Henry pleaded with the
Pope for forgiveness in a blizzard at the Alpine fortress of Canossa. The
clash broke out again but was settled in 1122 by a compromise that left the
Catholic Church with considerable power: ―the emperor guaranteed that
bishops and abbots would be freely elected by the church alone,‖ although
he retained the right to invest them with their rights of temporal property. 19
14

344 U.S. at 110, 119.
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429, 431, 435 (1962) (―[The Establishment Clause‘s] first and
most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and to degrade religion.‖) (link); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
212 (1948) (―[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best
work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.‖) (link).
16
Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy Scouts?,
22 ST. JOHN‘S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 523 (2007) (link).
17
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2006) (link).
18
See generally TIERNEY, supra note 4.
19
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 98 (photo. reprint 1999) (1983).
15
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In England, the famous conflict between King Henry II and Archbishop
Thomas Becket, which culminated in Becket‘s murder, also stemmed from,
among several other things, Henry‘s assertion of power to appoint bishops. 20
Because each side in these disputes prevailed only in a limited area—
popes over spiritual offices, kings over temporal matters—the result was a
―duality‖ of jurisdictions that ―profoundly influenced the development of
Western constitutionalism.‖21 As a leading authority on the controversy has
written, ―The very existence of two power structures competing for men‘s
allegiance instead of only one compelling obedience greatly enhanced the
possibilities for human freedom.‖22 Although Gregory VII asserted broad
papal supremacy over civil rulers, what he secured was ―the independence
of the clergy from secular control‖ in ecclesiastical matters like clergy
selection.23 This established a ―principle that royal jurisdiction was not
unlimited . . . and that it was not for the secular authority alone to decide
where its boundaries should be fixed.‖24 The freedom to select religious
leaders was a landmark in the development of limited government in the
West. By setting the precedent for limited government, institutional
religious freedom has promoted both political and religious liberty for all,
believers and nonbelievers alike.
Early Protestantism, in struggling against the Catholic Church, often
sought assistance from civil rulers, sometimes to the point of letting them
control clergy selection and other important religious functions. As
Michael McConnell has observed, the Reformation, by ―introduc[ing]
religious factions to Western Europe,‖ also introduced a ―novel danger[] to
public peace and freedom‖; the break-up in the universal church made it
―possible to form national churches . . . which could be more easily
dominated by the government.‖25 For instance, in the Church of England,
the most familiar example of an establishment to the American Founders,
the government appointed (and still appoints) the Archbishop of Canterbury
and other leading clerics.26 English civil rulers exercised many other
controls as well: the monarch was the official head of the church and had
the power to punish heresies, and Parliament enacted the Thirty-Nine
Articles (the church‘s doctrinal tenets) and the Book of Common Prayer,
requiring for many decades that most ministers pledge conformity to them. 27

20

See LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 18 (rev. ed. 1967).
TIERNEY, supra note 4, at 2.
22
Id.
23
BERMAN, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 87.
24
Id. at 269; see also Garnett, supra note 16, at 524–25.
25
Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1513–14 (1990).
26
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *364–83 (link).
27
MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, J OHN H. G ARVEY & THOMAS C. BERG, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 15 (3d ed. 2011).
21
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In rejecting a national establishment of religion, Americans necessarily
rejected a role for the federal government to choose church leaders. The
First Amendment confirms this rejection, as do early practices and policies.
In 1783, the Vatican proposed an agreement with Congress to approve a
Bishop-Apostolic for America since the new states were outside English
authority. Benjamin Franklin, who received the proposal as ambassador to
France, replied that ―‗it would be absolutely useless to send it to the
congress, which . . . can not . . . intervene in the ecclesiastical affairs of any
sect.‘‖28 The proposal triggered political opposition because the bishop
would be French, not American. Opponents urged Congress to reject the
appointment on that theologically neutral, ―secular‖ ground. Instead,
Congress responded that it had ―‗no authority to permit or refuse‘‖ the
appointment, and the Pope could appoint whomever he wished because
―‗the subject . . . being purely spiritual . . . is without the jurisdiction and
powers of Congress.‘‖29 This hands-off attitude toward ministerial
selections ―was of vital importance to all subsequent American history.‖30
Secretary of State James Madison reaffirmed the principle in 1806
when Roman Catholic Bishop John Carroll, again following European
practice, sought to consult Madison about whom to appoint to direct the
Catholic Church‘s affairs in the new Louisiana Territory. After conferring
with President Jefferson, Madison responded that ―the selection of
ecclesiastical individuals‖—of church ―functionaries‖—was an ―entirely
ecclesiastical‖ matter for the Catholic Church to decide, and that he would
adhere to ―the scrupulous policy of the Constitution in guarding against a
political interference in religious affairs.‖31
Throughout his life, Madison viewed the Constitution‘s principle of
church–state separation as forbidding government involvement in churches‘
internal affairs, especially clergy selection.
His first recorded
pronouncement on religion and government was an impassioned
denunciation of colonial Virginia‘s licensing of preachers.32 Later as
President, vetoing a bill specially incorporating an Episcopal church in the
District of Columbia, Madison objected that the bill enacted ―sundry rules
and proceedings relative purely to the organization and polity of the church
incorporated, and comprehending even the election and removal of the
Minister of the same; so that no change could be made therein‖ by the
28

1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 478 (1950) (quotation
omitted).
29
Id. at 479 (quotation omitted).
30
Id. Note that Congress said that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, not that it had
jurisdiction so long as it acted on the basis of a religion-neutral, secular, or nontheological basis.
31
Letter from James Madison to Bishop John Carroll (Nov. 20, 1806), in 20 RECORDS OF THE
AMERICAN CATHOLIC H ISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PHILADELPHIA 63–64 (1909) (link).
32
Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Jan. 24, 1774), in JAMES MADISON, 1
LETTERS AND O THER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: 1769–1793, at 10–13 (1884) (referring to the
―diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution‖) (link).
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congregation or the denomination. 33 For Madison, recognition of the
churches‘ authority to choose clergy went hand in hand with religious
liberty and church–state separation.
Other leading founding-era proponents of church–state separation
likewise understood it to protect religious institutions‘ autonomy over
clergy selection. Baptists and other dissenting groups who fought against
religious establishments in New England and the southern colonies did so
largely to preserve the autonomy of religious organizations from
government interference and manipulation. Isaac Backus, the leading voice
among Massachusetts Baptists, emphasized dual authorities in An Appeal
for Religious Liberty Against the Oppressions of the Present Day, 34 which
has been described as ―the best exposition of the eighteenth century pietistic
concept of [church–state] separation.‖35 According to Backus, ―God has
appointed two kinds of government in the world, which are distinct in their
nature, and ought never to be confounded together; one of which is called
civil, the other ecclesiastical government.‖36 From this distinction, Backus
directly drew implications concerning the appointment of leaders in each
institution. The determination of the ―offices of civil government is left to
human discretion,‖ but ―in ecclesiastical affairs we are most solemnly
warned not to be subject to ordinances, after the doctrines and
commandments of men.‖37 God ―has always claimed it as his sole
prerogative, to determine by express laws, what his worship shall be, who
shall minister in it, and how they shall be supported.‖38
Thomas Jefferson also saw church–state separation as guaranteeing the
autonomy, independence, and freedom of religious organizations—not just
churches but religious schools as well. In 1804, two years after his famous
letter to the Danbury Baptists in Connecticut endorsing a constitutional
―wall of separation,‖ Jefferson wrote another letter, this time to the Ursuline
Sisters of New Orleans, who operated a school for orphaned girls. The
order‘s prioress had written to Jefferson asking for assurance that the
Louisiana Purchase would not undermine their legal rights. Jefferson
replied that the principles of the Constitution ―are a sure guaranty to you
that [your property] will be preserved to you sacred and inviolate, and that
your Institution will be permitted to govern itself according to its own
voluntary rules without interference from the civil authority.‖39 Jefferson‘s
33

11 ANNALS OF CONG. 982–83 (1811) (emphasis added) (link).
ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AGAINST THE OPPRESSIONS
OF THE PRESENT DAY (1773) (link).
35
WILLIAM G. MC LOUGHLIN, ISAAC BACKUS AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION 123
(Oscar Handlin ed., 1967).
36
BACKUS, supra note 34, at 9.
37
Id. at 10 (citing Colossians 2:20, 2:22).
38
Id. (emphasis added).
39
1 STOKES, supra note 28, at 678 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (―Be assured that [your
Institution] will meet with all the protection my office can give it.‖).
34
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powerful statement affirming institutional autonomy encompasses the
freedom of a religious school to select its own leaders, even if his letter
does not say so explicitly. Although other arguments would be required to
show that teachers in religious schools fall within the ministerial
exception, 40 Jefferson‘s letter at least supports the proposition that
religiously affiliated schools have important interests in the freedom and
autonomy that goes with church–state separation.
State religious establishments, several of which continued after
ratification of the First Amendment, included among their features control
over the selection and conduct of clergy. Protests against such controls
were essential to the successful fights for religious liberty and
disestablishment in the states. Under the establishments of religion in New
England and the southern colonies, civil authorities regulated the conduct of
clergy in the established church, and at first prohibited, then gave limited
licenses to, preachers teachers of dissenting sects. Some regulations of
preachers had explicitly theological criteria.41 Other regulations did not, but
nevertheless imposed serious burdens. For example, in Virginia, licenses
only allowed named persons to preach in designated places and required
multiple applications, seriously burdening the Baptist practice of itinerant
teaching and evangelization.42 In New England, controversies focused on
whether dissenting clergy would be exempt from paying general taxes (as
were Congregational clergy) and whether dissenting groups would be
exempt from paying religious taxes—taxes to support clergy. Many
Baptists and Separate (or ―New Light‖) Congregationalists—both intensely
evangelical groups—believed that personal religious conversion was more
important for a preacher than professional training. 43 Establishment
proponents, in contrast, believed that teachers of religion should be
professionally educated, and both Connecticut and Massachusetts reacted
by passing laws in the mid-1700s ―preventing any church or parish from
choosing a minister who lacked a college degree.‖44 Such laws embittered
Baptists, and in 1773 led them to begin a ―massive civil disobedience‖
campaign against religious taxes.45
Finally, and significantly, the ―death-blow‖ to the Massachusetts
establishment came because of distress at civil authorities overriding

40

For a brief summary of such arguments, see infra note 57.
For example, Virginia tried preachers in the 1720s for ―speaking against the canons of the Church
of England.‖ CHARLES F. JAMES, DOCUMENTARY H ISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
IN VIRGINIA 24 (1900) (link).
42
See H. J. ECKENRODE, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN VIRGINIA: A STUDY IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE REVOLUTION 37–39 (1910) (link); JAMES, supra note 41, at 13, 26–38, 41.
43
1 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND D ISSENT 1630–1833: THE BAPTISTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 351 (1971).
44
Id. at 363; see also JACOB C. MEYER, CHURCH AND STATE IN MASSACHUSETTS 51 (1930).
45
1 MC LOUGHLIN, supra note 43, at 546.
41
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churches‘ choices concerning clergy.46 The issue arose from a rule allowing
each local majority to determine which religious leader would receive the
proceeds of clergy taxes, subject to dissenters‘ opt-outs. By the early
1800s, more and more Congregational parishes split between Trinitarians
and the growing number of Unitarians. In several cases, one side
constituted the majority in the church, the other side the majority in the
town (or ―parish‖). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that
the town‘s vote controlled which clergy member would occupy the ―First
Church‖ and receive tax funds.47 In the key case, Baker, the majority of
voters in the town of Dedham called a Unitarian minister, but the majority
of church members objected and withdrew, taking records, liturgical
materials, and trust funds with them. 48 When the court ruled that the town‘s
vote—the civil determination—controlled, the previously dominant
Trinitarians suddenly found themselves on the losing side. Within a few
years they ―conclude[d] that a religious establishment was no longer
workable . . . [and] that disestablishment was necessary to protect the
church against the control of the nonchurched.‖49 Under Baker, ―the secular
(non-members) citizens could overrule the communicants (the members) of
the church. This was the system of Erastianism from which the original
Puritan founders of Massachusetts had fled to the New World—the state as
superior to the church.‖50 As Part III elaborates, the ministerial exception
aims to prevent the very same harm: a civil body, jury, or judge, overruling
the selection of a minister made by the religious organization‘s authorities.
B. Case Law
Given the importance of clergy selection in our tradition of religious
institutional autonomy, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly forbidden the government from interfering in religious
institutions‘ decisions concerning the selection and supervision of leaders.
The Court in Kedroff invalidated a state statute that transferred authority
and property in the Russian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarch to
an American convention. 51 The Court held that the state had trespassed on
what was ―strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government‖: ―the power of the
46

SANFORD HOADLEY COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 515 (1902) (link).
Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. (16 Tyng) 488, 520–22 (1820); Burr v. Inhabitants of First Parish in
Sandwich, 9 Mass. (9 Tyng) 277, 297–98 (1812).
48
2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 43, at 1190.
49
STEVEN K. GREEN, THE SECOND D ISESTABLISHMENT: CHURCH AND STATE IN N INETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA 143 (2010); see also 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 43, at 1196 (―[Baker] produced
the final and fatal crack in the [Massachusetts establishment].‖).
50
WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, SOUL LIBERTY: THE BAPTISTS‘ STRUGGLE IN NEW ENGLAND, 1630–
1833, at 299 (1991).
51
See Richard W. Garnett, “Things That Are Not Caesar’s”: The Story of Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, in RICHARD W. GARNETT & ANDREW KOPPELMAN, FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES
(forthcoming 2011).
47
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Supreme Church Authority of the Russian Orthodox Church to appoint the
ruling hierarch of the archdiocese of North America.‖52 Likewise, in
Milivojevich, the Court invalidated a state court decision that overturned the
Serbian Orthodox Church‘s defrocking of its American bishop. The Court
held that civil courts must accept the decision of a hierarchical church‘s
tribunal in ―disputes over the government and direction of subordinate
[church] bodies,‖ including clergy selection and discipline. 53 Finally, the
decision in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila states that
―[b]ecause the appointment [of a Catholic chaplain] is a canonical act, it is
the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential
qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses
them.‖54 In short, the importance of organizations‘ control over the
selection of ministers is recognized in case law as well as history.
III. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION, SEPARATION, AND FREEDOM
The ministerial exception follows directly from the principle that
religious organizations should control the selection and discipline of
ministers because such matters are beyond the rightful power of civil
government. The exception bars any claim by an employee ―the resolution
of which would limit a religious institution‘s right to select who will
perform particular spiritual functions.‖55
Unquestionably, a
nondiscrimination suit seeks to override the church‘s decision concerning
such ministerial personnel. The threatened government action is especially
intrusive when the plaintiff seeks a court order reinstating her to the
position. In such a case the court is literally appointing a minister. But an
award of damages (including back pay, emotional distress, punitive
damages and attorney‘s fees) is also highly burdensome since it operates as
a tax on protected decisions concerning ministerial personnel. As the Court
has recognized, ―Fear of potential liability [for employment discrimination]
might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its
religious mission.‖56
Accordingly, ministerial-exception decisions
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Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952).
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724–25 (1976).
54
280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (noting that secular courts must accept ―decisions of the proper church
tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights‖) (link).
55
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2006) (link); see also Schleicher v.
Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008) (link). The absolute bar to liability erected by the
ministerial exception applies to lawsuits between the minister and the religious organization, or in suits
by a government agency, like the EEOC, seeking to directly assert the minister‘s interest. The essence
of these cases is a dispute over the organization‘s right to select ministers. In some other cases, by
contrast, a religious organization‘s selection or supervision of ministers comes into question only as a
secondary issue in a suit by a third party: for example, in suits seeking to hold the organization liable for
acts of abuse committed by one of its ministers.
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Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 336 (1987) (link).
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recognize why selecting leaders has historically been a very sensitive task
for religious organizations:
A minister is not merely an employee of the church; she is
the embodiment of its message. A minister serves as the
church‘s public representative, its ambassador, and its
voice to the faithful. Accordingly, the process of selecting
a minister is per se a religious exercise. As the Fifth
Circuit explained: ―The relationship between an organized
church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the
chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its
purpose.‖ . . . ‖Matters touching this relationship must
necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical
concern.‖57
Like religious institutional autonomy in general, the ministerial
exception rests on both Religion Clauses. The first ministerial-exception
case, McClure, held that the application of nondiscrimination laws violated
the ―free exercise of religion.‖58 But the opinion added establishmentrelated language as well, saying that the process of court intervention and
investigation ―could only produce by its coercive effect the very opposite of
that separation of church and State contemplated by the First
Amendment.‖59
One ground for the ministerial exception is that
nondiscrimination suits will frequently call on civil courts to make
essentially theological judgments about whether the plaintiff was suited for
57

Petruska, 462 F.3d at 306 (quoting McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558–59 (5th Cir.
1972) (link)).
Although this article does not address in detail which employees count as ―ministers,‖ we believe
that they should include employees with duties to lead the religious organization, teach the faith, or
participate in the moral or spiritual formation of community members. The definition should extend
beyond formal clergy or ordained positions and should be interpreted reasonably flexibly. Religious
organizations have multiple ways of defining their leadership roles—only some emphasize ordination—
and the history in Parts I and II shows that narrow or formalistic state definitions of protected ministerial
status have always excluded some groups and triggered dissension. For elaboration of these arguments,
see Amicus Brief, supra note 3, at 28–32.
Under this approach, the exception should cover teachers with religious duties in religious schools,
including many classroom teachers that teach a variety of subjects, who play vital roles in moral and
spiritual formation by teaching students behavioral rules and enforcing discipline. At the very least, the
teacher position at issue in Hosanna-Tabor presents an easy case: the plaintiff, Cheryl Perich, taught
religion classes, led students in prayers, and was formally ―commissioned‖ and ―called‖ as a teacher by
the Church Congregation after undergoing training in Lutheran theology over several years (see Brief
for the Petitioner at 41, 47–48, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, No. 10553 (2011), 2011 WL 2414707, at *41, 47–48 [hereinafter Petitioner‘s Brief]) (link). For elaboration of
these arguments, see Amicus Brief, supra note 3, at 32–38.
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McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
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a religious leadership role or performed it well. Nondiscrimination suits
typically turn on questions of ―pretext‖: the employer asserts that it
discharged the plaintiff for a nondiscriminatory reason, and the plaintiff
challenges that reason as a pretext for discrimination. 60 In cases involving
personnel with important religious functions, the organization‘s asserted
nondiscriminatory motive will usually be religious in nature or have
religious implications. To decide whether the organization‘s assertion of a
religious motive is credible, judges and juries inevitably will have to
examine it closely; they will have to second guess ―[a] church‘s view on
whether an individual is suited for a particular clergy position.‖61
The Sixth Circuit in Hosanna-Tabor concluded that such a concern
was inapplicable in that case. The court reasoned that Ms. Perich‘s ―claim
would not require the court to analyze any church doctrine; rather a trial
would focus on issues such as whether Perich was disabled within the
meaning of the ADA, whether Perich opposed a practice that was unlawful
under the ADA, and whether Hosanna-Tabor violated the ADA‖ in the way
it treated Ms. Perich.62 This conclusion is unsound for several reasons.
First, the ministerial exception is not designed merely to keep courts
from deciding contested theological questions. The exception also protects
the distinctive religious-freedom interest—deeply rooted in the history, as
summarized in Parts I and II—that religious organizations should be free to
choose their leaders. The question of who will give spiritual leadership to
the organization is a ―matter[] of church government‖63—of ―prime
ecclesiastical concern‖64—whether or not a civil court‘s interference
includes an explicit theological ruling. If a court reinstates a minister over
the church‘s objection or imposes a damages award for the church‘s
decision, the result is no less harmful to the church simply because it comes
from the application of a theologically neutral rule. The church still is
forced to accept, or pay damages for refusing to accept, a leader who it
believes is unsuitable. For this reason, most courts hold, as they should,
that the applicability of the ministerial exception does not depend on the
church identifying a rationale in ―church doctrine or ecclesiastical law‖ for
its employment action.65 The Supreme Court‘s rulings confirm that
60

See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (link).
Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000) (link).
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EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 781–82 (6th Cir.
2010) (link).
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Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
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McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 1972).
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See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 305 n.7, 307 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Gellington,
203 F.3d at 1303) (internal quotation mark omitted); id. at 304 n.7 (noting that the ministerial exception
―protects the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it‖ (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conference
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (link))); see also Thomas C. Berg,
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165, 172–76 (2009).
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government interference with clergy decisions is barred independent of the
presence of theological questions.66
As the history set out above shows, the government can trigger the
harms that the Religion Clauses seek to avoid—coercion, church–state
conflict, government overreaching—simply by overriding a church‘s
decision regarding an individual‘s suitability to serve as its minister. Under
the Massachusetts voting scheme for clergy taxes, the majority of town
voters did not need to state a theological rationale for selecting one
clergyman for the ―First Church.‖ Rather, they could cast their vote based
on any factor. Nevertheless, the distress caused when town voters overrode
church members‘ wishes was enough to end the Massachusetts
establishment. Both the Virginia limit on the number of places where a
minister could be licensed to speak and the Massachusetts requirement of
college training for ministers were formally neutral among theologies and
called for no doctrinal determination. Yet Virginia‘s jailing of unlicensed
itinerant preachers provoked Madison to charge ―persecution,‖ and the
Massachusetts college-education requirement embittered the Baptists
enough to drive them into ―massive civil disobedience.‖67
In addition, even if the government claims to rest on a formally neutral
rule of law in overriding a church‘s choice of minister, this claim frequently
turns out to be misleading. Indeed, questions that might seem facially
nonreligious take on a religious coloration in a dispute between a religious
organization and one of its ministers. For example, in Milivojevich, the
Illinois Supreme Court, in overturning the bishop‘s defrocking, had ―relied
on purported ‗neutral principles‘ . . . which would ‗not in any way entangle
this court in the determination of theological or doctrinal matters.‘‖68
Nevertheless, the Court found that the state court entangled itself in
religious questions by ―substitut[ing] its interpretation‖ of the church‘s
constitutions ―for that of the [church‘s] highest ecclesiastical tribunals.‖69
This pattern repeats throughout history. Advocates of the Massachusetts
law requiring college education for ministers, for instance, might have
argued that it did not reflect any theological determination by the state—
merely a judgment that a preacher of any theology should have formal
schooling given preachers‘ influence in the community. But in practice, the
66

See Emp‘t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (noting that the state may not intervene ―in
controversies over religious authority or dogma‖ (emphasis added)) (link). A dispute over whether a
religious organization can discharge a minister is surely a controversy over religious authority. For
courts to abstain only when doctrinal questions are present is to make Smith‘s reference to controversies
over religious authority meaningless. The Court could have spoken only of ―controversies
over . . . dogma.‖ Id.; see also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1872) (barring civil courts
from matters of ―ecclesiastical government‖ as well as ―theological controversy‖).
67
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requirement implicated the deep theological division between the
establishment Congregationalists and the evangelical groups over the
importance of formal learning as opposed to personal religious experience. 70
Hosanna-Tabor exemplifies how theological or religious issues are
almost impossible to avoid in cases involving employees with spiritual
duties. When Hosanna-Tabor declined to let Ms. Perich return from her
leave in the middle of the semester, she responded by threatening to sue and
behaving in other ways that the principal and school board regarded as
confrontational and disruptive. Hosanna-Tabor believed that her behavior
violated New Testament injunctions against resorting to civil courts in
disputes among Christians, and that she had ―‗create[d] upheaval‘‖ at the
school and demonstrated ―‗a total lack of concern for the ministry of
Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran School.‘‖71 A majority of the local church
congregation that sponsored the school agreed and voted to rescind her
―call‖ to teach. Ms. Perich claims that these reasons are pretexts for
discrimination, but her claims require the courts to delve deep into the
religious motives of multiple church bodies and members. As HosannaTabor argues in its main brief, the pretext inquiry ―would necessarily
devolve into an investigation of the Church‘s beliefs. Do Lutherans really
believe in non-litigious, internal resolution of disputes over fitness for
ministry? Does that teaching apply to this case? Did it actually motivate
the congregation?‖72 Ultimately, the congregation terminated Ms. Perich‘s
―call‖ because it had lost confidence in her ability to represent HosannaTabor‘s beliefs and purposes to children in light of her behavior
surrounding the request to return. If she were reinstated, every parent and
every child would know she had defied Lutheran teaching to get there.
Given those circumstances, it is hard to see how she could be an effective
―voice to the faithful‖ on Hosanna-Tabor‘s behalf.73
Even more
fundamentally, though, it is up to Hosanna-Tabor, not a jury or judge, to
decide whether she could be effective.
Finally, the ministerial exception protects against the burdens of
litigation and investigation, independent of the results. As the Court stated
in refusing to extend National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction to
religious-school teachers: ―It is not only the conclusions that may be
reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the
Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to findings
70

This history shows that the ministerial exception should apply even when the government
interferes through a rule involving no explicit theological determination. It is true that—unlike the
historical laws imposing unique requirements on ministers—antidiscrimination laws may qualify as
―generally applicable‖ under Employment Division v. Smith (see 494 U.S. at 878–80). But for various
reasons, some of which we have already discussed, Smith does not bar the ministerial exception, which
survives as a distinct constitutional protection. See, e.g., supra note 66.
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and conclusions.‖74 If courts permitted nondiscrimination suits to proceed,
―[c]hurch personnel and records would inevitably become subject to
subpoena, discovery, cross-examination, the full panoply of legal process
designed to probe the mind of the church in the selection of its ministers.‖75
Religious organizations not only suffer direct burdens from such expense
and scrutiny; they also ―might make [decisions] with an eye to avoiding
litigation or bureaucratic entanglement rather than upon the basis of their
own personal and doctrinal assessments of who would best serve the
pastoral needs of their members.‖76
CONCLUSION
The ministerial exception is constitutionally required, historically
rooted, and essential to limited government and thus to political and
religious freedom. However, it does not rest on an assumption that
religious institutions and employers never behave badly. Of course, they
sometimes do, as do we all. Its premise is not that churches are ―above the
law.‖ They are not. Its point is not ―discrimination is fine if churches do
it.‖ It is, instead, that there are some questions the civil courts do not have
the power to answer, some wrongs that a constitutional commitment to
church–state separation puts beyond the law‘s corrective reach, and some
relationships that government should not presume to supervise, such as the
relationship between a religious congregation and those who lead it, teach
the faith, or supervise members‘ moral and spiritual formation.
To be sure, not every employee of a religious organization is
―ministerial,‖ for many are not. And religious institutions—like all
employers—have legal obligations to their employees, whether ministerial
or not. Although there are difficult questions to be asked and fine lines to
be drawn, when it comes to interpreting the First Amendment‘s boundary
between church and state, it cannot be the role of civil government to police
the decisions of religious communities regarding who should be their
leaders and teachers any more than the civil courts should review disputes
over the meaning of religious doctrines.
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